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Scope of Topic
Our topic is competency of a Substitute Decisionmaker
(SubDM) to make a decision about medical treatment for another
who is incompetent himself (the “ward”). While there is
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considerable literature on competency to decide for oneself,1 there
is very little on competency to decide for another.2 Some studies
look at a range of things that a SubDM needs to do3—for example,
seek information on what the ward has said—but there is none
on how well a person must understand the relevant issues to be a
competent SubDM.
Why would this question arise? Clearly we would not select
someone to be a guardian if we knew him to be decisionally

1.

See, e.g., Stephen H. Behnke & Elyn R. Saks, Competency to
Decide on Treatment and Research: MacArthur and Beyond, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103 (1999); Jessica Wilen Berg et al.,
Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal
Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345
(1996); William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process
as a Source of Protection for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs,
31 IND. L. REV. 937 (1998); Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just
Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283 (1992); Phillip Harris &
Kirsten Stalker, The Exercise of Choice by Adults with Intellectual
Disabilities: A Literature Review, 11 J. APPLIED RES. INTELL.
DISABILITIES 60 (1998); Molly S. Jacobs et al., Competence-Related
Abilities and Psychiatric Symptoms: An Analysis of the Underlying
Structure and Correlates of the MacCAT-CA and the BPRS, 32
LAW HUM. BEHAV. 64 (2008); Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks
Care: Competency to Make Medical Treatment Decision and
Parens Patriae of Civil Commitments, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
561 (2012); Daniel C. Marson et al., Consistency of Physicians’
Legal Standard and Personal Judgments of Competency in Patients
with Alzheimer’s Disease, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS & SOC’Y 911
(2000); Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgement: Assessing the
Competence of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 343 (1995).

2.

In fact, we have found no literature on competency of SubDMs per
se to make these decisions, though there is literature on some tasks
that SubDMs must do. The following databases were searched:
Westlaw (Journals and Law Reviews); AgeLine; ProQuest (Social
Sciences/PsycINFO); Web of Science; PubMed; and, Google
Scholar.

3.

E.g., Emily H. Bower, Evaluation of a Tube Feeding Decision Aid
for Substitute Decision Makers, W. VA. U. GRAD. THESES,
DISSERTATIONS, AND PROBLEM REPORTS 2385 (2006); Nina A.
Kohn, Matched Preferences and Values: A New Approach to
Selecting Legal Surrogates, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 399 (2015); Linda
S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making
Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV.
1491 (2012).
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impaired. But an appointed guardian could become impaired.
Also, sometimes family surrogates who are not court-appointed
but serve as proxy decisionmakers will have impairments. Or a
Durable Power of Attorney (DPA) competent at the time that
the document is drawn up, but impaired now, will be the SubDM.
Indeed, likely a fairly standard scenario is when spouses
appoint each other as DPA. Suppose one of the spouses becomes
severely demented. And suppose the other spouse is suffering
impairments as well. This may be a case where we would want
the nondemented spouse to be evaluated to make sure that she
has sufficient capacity to be a SubDM.
In short, it is a useful theoretical exercise to see what the
SubDM must be able to know. The point of the exercise is to
suggest what level of capacity the SubDM must have and how
much departure from the ideal would be allowed. That’s to say,
we are trying to establish how competent the SubDM must be.
If the SubDM has to have a relatively high level of
decisionmaking capacity when the ward doesn’t, then, as I will
suggest, the question is how we arrive at and justify that
conclusion, and what that level of capacity looks like. In the last
section, we locate this question in the context of our standards
requiring reasonable care when one acts on behalf of another.

I.

The Legal Landscape

The space we are occupying for this problem is that of a
patient’s literal incompetency that is enough to justify a SubDM,
for example a court-appointed guardian or a DPA. Typically,
guardianship is divided into guardian of the person and guardian
of the estate.4 These are called plenary guardianships.5 Many
jurisdictions also have limited guardianship: for example, the
ward can make financial decisions, but not exceeding a certain
4.

Phillip B. Tor & Bruce D. Sales, A Social Science Perspective on
the Law of Guardianship: Directions for Improving the Process and
Practice, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 4 (1994); Judith C. Barker
& David King, Taking Care of My Parents’ Friends: Non-Kin
Guardians and Their Older Female Wards, 13 J. ELDER ABUSE &
NEGLECT 45, 49 (2001).

5.

Tor & Sales, supra note 4, at 3; Rachel M. Kane, 28 FLA. JUR.
GUARDIAN & WARD 2D, Definitions § 1 Westlaw (database
updated Nov. 2019); Mary J. Quinn & Howard S. Krooks, The
Relationship Between the Guardian and the Court, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 1611, 1620 (2012).
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amount; or, the ward can make most life decisions, but not many
medical decisions.6 Scholars have noted, however, that limited
guardianships are actually rarely used in practice.7
In seventy-five percent of cases, the guardian will be a family
member,8 and there are lists of who may serve in order of priority.9
For example, spouses come before adult children and adult
children come before parents.
Guardians of the person can make all sorts of decisions for
their ward—where to live, with whom to associate, whom to
marry, to whom to bequeath an estate.10 The focus of this paper
will be on medical decisionmaking. The group of people subject
to guardianship is getting smaller and smaller as there is a move
toward helping people with decisional impairments make
decisions in collaboration with others, such as family and friends
and professionals.11 This is called Supported Decisionmaking
(SDM).
6.

See Tor & Sales, supra note 4, at 18 n. 90; Kane, supra note 5;
Quinn & Krooks, supra note 5, at 1620.

7.

E.g., Tor & Sales, supra note 4, at 20; Michael E. Bloom, Asperger’s
Disorder, High-Functioning Autism, and Guardianship in Ohio, 42
AKRON L. REV. 955 (2009); Jamie L. Leary, A Review of Two
Recently Reformed Guardianship Statutes: Balancing the Need to
Protect Individuals Who Cannot Protect Themselves Against the
Need to Guard Individual Autonomy, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 245
(1997); Jan Ellen Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-Determination
of the Elderly in the Face of Competing Interests and Grim
Alternatives: A Proposal for Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1818 (1992); Barbara A. Venesy, 1990
Guardianship Law Safeguards Personal Rights Yet Protects
Vulnerable Elderly, 24 AKRON L. REV. 161, 176 (1990).

8.

Tor & Sales, supra note 4, at 20, 35.

9.

Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Priority and Preference in
Appointment of Conservator or Guardian for an Incompetent, 65
A.L.R.3d 991, *2 (2016); Amy Brown, Broadening Anachronistic
Notions of “Family” in Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmarried
Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1045–47 (1990).

10.

Kim Dayton, Standards for Health Care Decision-Making: Legal
and Practical Considerations, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1329
(2012); Mark D. Andrews, The Elderly in Guardianship: A Crisis
of Constitutional Proportions, 5 ELDER L. J. 75, 76 (1997); Bloom,
supra note 7, at 962–63; Leary, supra note 7, at 245; Rein, supra
note 7, at 1824–26; Venesy, supra note 7, at 164.

11.

See, e.g., Michelle Browning et al., Supported Decision Making:
Understanding How Its Conceptual Link to Legal Capacity Is

4
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SDM is in use with developmentally disabled and demented
patients. Together with colleagues, I am conducting two studies
of SDM in the case of people with mental health disorders, in
particular schizophrenia and bipolar illness—the first of their kind
in this population. One funded study will look at whom patients
choose to be their supporters and why, their satisfaction with the
decision-making process, and downstream effects on quality of
life, such as living and working more independently. We have four
sites with this study—USC, UCLA, UCSD, and SUNY
Downstate—and at this point France and Israel are possibilities,
so we will have an international perspective.
The second is a contract with California’s Mental Health
Services Oversight and Accountability Commission (MHSOAC)
for an Innovation Plan around PADS and SDM. This project will
look at SDM and Psychiatric Advance Directives (PADs), both
in the civil sphere and in criminal justice. This multi-county
Innovation Project is intended to support counties in the
implementation and evaluation of using PADs and SDM to
improve access to care, the appropriateness and quality of care to
improve outcomes for consumers at risk of involuntary care and
criminal justice involvement. Psychiatric Directives are used in
times of crisis that can be episodic with the likelihood of
individuals stabilizing and retaining their immediate decision
making authority. We will approach a number of County
Departments of Mental Health in California to consider SDM and
PADs in their jurisdictions, and we will choose two to four to
study intensively. Both of these projects have received significant
funding.
In any event, SDM is not that different from how most people
make important decisions. That is, they consult family and
friends to try to make the best decision they can. It appears
anecdotally that this kind of collaboration is possible and does
Influencing the Development of Practice, 1 RES. & PRAC. IN INTEL.
& DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 34, 35, 37 (2014); Robert D.
Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The
Difficult Road from Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making,
19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 9 (2012); Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported
Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN
STATE L. REV. 1111, 1111 (2013); Rachel Chabany & Shirli Werner,
Guardianship Law Versus Supported Decision-Making Policies:
Perceptions of Persons with Intellectual or Psychiatric Disabilities
and Parents, 86 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 486, 487 (2016).

5
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increase the decisional authority of people with impairments—
e.g. developmentally disabled and demented people.12 This, in
turn, increases their quality of life,13 essentially permitting more
people to be the architects of their own lives.
But it cannot be a complete substitute for the incompetent
ward-guardianship scenario.14 Consider a person with severe
developmental disability who has the mental age of a one-yearold. No amount of effort can help him to understand the choices
that he faces. We can’t even ask him what he wants or prefers:
he doesn’t understand our questions. Or, take an individual who
has severe Alzheimer’s. He or she can’t put two sentences together
or understand two sentences put together.
What about floridly psychotic people who can’t make
decisions, for example, a person in the midst of a psychotic
episode with delusions and hallucinations around the choice? We
can’t convince him that his beliefs are untrue, and he is deciding
based on his beliefs. (Of course, the beliefs of some psychotic
people may be irrelevant to their choice and then they may have
capacity to choose.) Or, suppose that a psychotic person is so
disorganized and confused that he can’t track the informed
consent conversation. This could conceivably be remedied with
simplified explanations, but sometimes not.15

12.

See Johanne Eliacin et al., Factors Influencing Patients’
Preferences and Perceived Involvement in Shared Decision-making
in Mental Health Care, 24 J. MENTAL HEALTH 24 (2014); Julie
Beadle-Brown et al., Person-Centered Active Support—Increasing
Choice, Promoting Independence and Reducing Challenging
Behavior, 25 J. APPLIED RES. IN INTELL. DISABILITIES 291, 303
(2012).

13.

See Annika Tagizadeh Larsson & Ann-Charlotte Nedlund, To
Protect and to Support: How Citizenship and Self-Determination
Are Legally Constructed and Managed in Practice for People Living
with Dementia in Sweden, 15 DEMENTIA 343 (2016); Sharon Lawn
et al., Mental Health Recovery and Voting: Why Being Treated as
a Citizen Matters and How We Can Do It, 21 J. PSYCHIATRIC &
MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 289, 290 (2014).

14.

Kohn et al., supra note 11, at 1154–55; Dinerstein, supra note 11,
at 10; Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):
Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration
Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 UNIV.
COLO. L. REV. 157, 181–182 (2010).

15.

Laura B. Dunn et al., Enhancing Comprehension of Consent for
Research in Older Patients with Psychosis: A Randomized Study

6
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Of course, one could say that one should at least ask the ward
what he or she wants. So, perhaps the most compelling case where
a guardian is needed—and would have the fullest authority—is
when the patient is in a coma.
In the bulk of these cases, we will of course try to help the
person understand and decide, but will not always succeed. There
are studies, for example, those by Dr. Laura Dunn and colleagues,
that show that with “enhanced consent” protocols, a significantly
greater proportion of patients with schizophrenia and other
psychotic disorders score 100% on first and second trials of the
posttest compared to those receiving the routine procedure.16 We
can accommodate the SDM’s decisionmaking deficiency in each
of these examples.
Still, not everyone can be restored to competency. Enter
SubDMs. These will be the cases where the SubDM makes the
choice for the ward. Below we discuss the standards that are used.
Note also that while we are discussing the capacity of
SubDMs to decide for their ward, it will be well at some point to
consider the capacity of the supports in SDM. Perhaps they need
less capacity because the ward has some decisional authority. Or
perhaps they will need more capacity because they must more
finely judge when and where the ward can decide. They will also
clearly need other skills than a SubDM, e.g., to be able more
thoroughly to engage the person whose decision is at issue. But
for now I focus on SubDMs.17
I turn to the context of competency to decide for oneself to
see what abilities are required. I turn then to the abilities required
in the SubDM context—are they the same as or different from
the ones in the case of the person deciding for herself?

II. Competency to Decide for Oneself: The
Comparison
There are three criteria that any adequate competency
standard must meet. First, it must meet the “abilities” criterion,
of a Novel Consent Procedure, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1911–13
(2001).
16.

Id. at 1913.

17.

This begs the question whether to put supports in place for an
impaired SubDM or simply remove her or him from the case. But
that is an inquiry for another time.

7
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i.e., it faithfully identifies the abilities that are necessary to
making decisions that deserve deference. Second, it must meet the
“unconventionality” criterion, which mandates that a competency
standard protect a person’s expression of her values and beliefs,
however unconventional. This is so because one important
purpose of the competency doctrine is to allow people to pursue
their interests according to their own lights. Freedom to decide
includes, within limits, freedom to decide what is true no less than
what is good. Finally, the “irrationality” criterion requires that a
competency standard designate a reasonably small class of
individuals as incompetent in the face of the pervasive influence
of the irrational and the unconscious.18
Both the “unconventiality” criterion and the “irrationality”
criterion have an effect on the “abilities” criterion. The
“unconventionality” criterion means that a wide range of abilities
will be allowed, because to do otherwise would trench too much
on choice; and the “irrationality” criterion means that a wide
range of abilities will be allowed because if we ruled out choices
with any degree of irrationality, there would be few choices
remaining to be honored.19 This is the backdrop against which a
competency standard must be measured. Numerous tests and
standards exist in the literature. Along with colleagues, I reviewed
some of them in an article in the American Journal of Psychiatry
in 2006.20
The “gold standard” is probably the MacArthur instruments.
They look at four different components of competency: (1) does
one “understand” the relevant information, for example, the
nature of the procedure and the risks and benefits; (2) does one
“appreciate” how this information applies to oneself; (3) can one
“reason” with the information, for example, is one able to think
comparatively or, where warranted, in probabilistic terms about
different options; and, (4) can one “evidence a choice”? 21
18.

Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV.
945, 949 (1991); Saks & Behnke, supra note 1, at 130.

19.

Saks, supra note 18, at 950.

20.

See Elyn R. Saks et al., Assessing Decisional Capacity for Clinical
Research or Treatment: A Review of Instruments, 163 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1323 (2006).

21.

See Elyn R. Saks & Dilip V. Jeste, Capacity to Constent to or
Refuse Treatment and/or Research: Theoretical Considerations, 24
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 411 (2006).

8
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(Obviously, if one can’t, then that choice can’t be honored.) The
MacArthur researchers have sketched out the meaning of these
four component abilities and have studied them in application to
patients with, for example,depression and schizophrenia.22
To me, there are three problems with the Macarthur
instruments. First, the distinction between their concepts of
understanding and appreciating is not well taken.23 Essentially,
appreciating is a subset of understanding: forming adequate
beliefs about the illness and procedure (“understanding”) and
forming adequate beliefs about these things with reference to
oneself (“appreciating”). In other words, the two skills are the
same skill applied to different things. To me this is not ideal.
Second, the MacArthur instruments at least veer in the direction
of requiring the patient to have mostly true beliefs.24 I believe a
better standard would require having no patently false beliefs
(PFBs), rather than having no false beliefs at all. Below we
discuss why the PFB standard is the most appropriate standard.
Third, the MacArthur instruments are agnostic on the question
of how incapable a person should be to take away his choice. That
22.

See, e.g., Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur
Treatment Competence Study. III: Abilities of Patients to Consent
to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV.
149, 149 (1995); Duncan Milne et al., Community Treatment
Orders and Competence to Consent, 17 AUSTRL. PSYCHIATRY 273
(2009); Bruce J. Winick, The Macarthur Treatment Competence
Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y,
& L. 137, 137–138 (1996); Michael Koelch et al., Report of an Initial
Pilot Study on the Feasibility of Using the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool for Clinical Research in Children and Adolescents
with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 20 J. OF CHILD AND
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 63 (2010); Trudi Kirk &
Donald N. Bersoff, How Many Procedural Safeguards Does It Take
to Get a Psychiatrist to Leave the Lightbulb Unchanged? A Due
Process Analysis of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study,
2 PSYCH. PUB. POL. AND L. 45, 62 (1996); JAMES G. SHARRATT, THE
EFFICACY OF THE MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL
FOR TREATMENT DECISIONS (MACCAT-T) TO ASSESS SOUTH
AFRICAN PATIENTS’ ABILITIES TO GIVE CONSENT TO TREATMENT,
at 5 (Sept. 1997) (on file with Univ. of Stellenbosch).

23.

Saks & Jeste, supra note 21, at 414.

24.

See Berg et al., supra note 1, at 355–57; Christopher Slobogin,
Appreciation as a Measure of Competency: Some Thoughts About
the MacArthur Group’s Approach, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L.
18, 20–21 (1996).
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is, they don’t address the normative issues around establishing a
cut point.25 On the other hand, they do suggest a level they call
“impaired.”
Thus, I have suggested that competency to make treatment
decisions requires26: (1) “understanding,” in the sense of
comprehending what is being told to one; (2) “appreciating,” in
the sense of forming acceptable beliefs about what one is told; (3)
“reasoning” with the information; and (4) “evidencing a choice.”
With this standard, “understanding” and “appreciating” require
different skills—comprehension and belief-formation.
And under “appreciating,” again, we need to specify how
distorted one’s beliefs must be to vitiate capacity. So, I and my
colleagues have suggested that the concept of a PFB should
govern.27 This gives people maximal decisional authority,
including the authority to say what is true. It also takes into
account the fact that many “truths” are unknown and considers
the fact that many people are at least somewhat irrational. In
other words, the “unconventionality” criterion allows all beliefs
except the PFBs. And the “irrationality” criterion allows
irrational beliefs so long as they are not patently false.
As for the definition of PFBs, they are beliefs that are grossly
improbable for any of three reasons. First, PFBs may be
“impossible” or violate the laws of nature.28 An example would be
that one’s thoughts can kill. Second, a PFB may be practically
impossible; that is, a belief so improbable that we feel confident

25.

Saks & Behnke, supra note 1, at 125; Saks & Jeste, supra note 21,
at 414; See Vijay A. Mittal et al., Ethical, Legal, and Clinical
Considerations when Disclosing a High-Risk Syndrome for
Psychosis, 29 BIOETHICS 543, 555 (2015).

26.

Saks & Behnke, supra note 1, at 112–13; Saks, supra note 18, at
960; Mittal et al., supra note 25, at 553.

27.

E.g., ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 185 (2010) [hereinafter SAKS—
REFUSING CARE]; Dilip V. Jeste et al., A Collaborative Model for
Research on Decisional Capacity and Informed Consent in Older
Patients with Schizophrenia: Bioethics Unit of a Geriatric
Psychiatry
Intervention
Research
Center,
171
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 68, 71 (2003); Elyn R. Saks, Competency
to Refuse Medication: Revisiting the Role of Denial of Mental
Illness in Capacity Determinations, 22 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST.
167, 170 (2013).

28.

SAKS—REFUSING CARE, supra note 27, at 183.
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in saying it is false without additional evidence.29 An example
would be that one is able to calculate as fast as a supercomputer.
Finally, a PFB may be a belief that represents a gross distortion
of obvious facts; that is, a belief that flies in the face of empirical
happenings obvious to everyone.30 An example would be that
there is a large spaceship in the middle of New York’s Times
Square.
I have studied this concept of competency, in particular of
appreciation. Together with some colleagues at UCSD Medical
School, I have developed an instrument called the “California
Scale of Appreciation” (CSA), which has 18 items rated in
accordance with a PFB standard.31 For example, one statement
is “[t]he researcher has special abilities or powers that will protect
me from all harm.”32 If the subject says yes, then there is an effort
to see if he really means this literally or is exaggerating or
speaking metaphorically, and the item is scored accordingly.33
We have studied the CSA in thirty-nine patients (twentyseven outpatients and twelve inpatients) with schizophrenia or a
related psychotic disorder; and in fifteen normal comparison
subjects.34 The mean total CSA score was significantly lower in
patients than in the normal comparison subjects; however, a
majority of the patients were found to be fully capable on the
CSA.35 As expected, it calls fewer people with schizophrenia
incompetent than the MacArthur Appreciation instrument calls
impaired. The latter is around twenty-five percent,36 while the
former is around twelve percent.37
In conclusion, my standard adequately deals with the three
problems raised about MacArthur: it identifies different skills
29.

Id. at 183–84.

30.

Id. at 184.

31.

See Elyn R. Saks, et al., The California Scale of Appreciation: A
New Instrument to Measure the Appreciation Component of
Capacity to Consent to Research, 10 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCH. 166,
167 (2002) [hereinafter Saks et al.—California Scale].

32.

Id. at 169.

33.

Id.

34.

Id. at 167.

35.

Id. at 171.

36.

Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 22, at 171.

37.

Saks et al.—California Scale, supra note 31, at 170.
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under understanding and appreciating; it better identifies the
kinds of distortions that should vitiate capacity; and it draws a
normative line at the point that relevant beliefs become patently
false.
In what follows, I use my own notion of what competency
requires—for example, no PFBs under the Appreciation part.

III. The Threshold Question on Competency to
Decide for Another
When determining one’s competency to decide for another,
the threshold question is what standard to use: “substituted
judgment”; or, “best interests.” For substituted judgment one
wants to select the choice the ward would have wanted if
competent.38 For best interests, one wants to select the option
that serves the best interests of the ward.39
Often the rule is to use substituted judgment; but, if it’s
difficult to tell, then use best interests.40 The reason for this is
that the substituted-judgment standard most respects the
person’s autonomy; we are deciding what the autonomous self
would have wanted. Sometimes, though, we just don’t know, and
in that event, we turn to the best-interests standard.

IV. Complications with the Substituted-Judgment
Standard
In asking “what choice the ward would have wanted if
competent,” “competent” can mean barely competent, very
38.

E.g., In re Truselo, 846 A.2d 256, 271 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2000); In re
Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 911 (Pa. 1996); Matter of Tavel, 661 A.2d
1061, 1068 (Del. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-101 (2019); D.C.
CODE § 7-1301.03 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-711
(West 2018).

39.

E.g., Matter of Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 75 (Wis.
1992); In re AMB, 640 N.W.2d 262, 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001);
D.C. CODE § 7-1301.03 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§ 13-711 (West 2018).

40.

See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d
713, 721 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); D.C. CODE § 21-2047.02 (2008);
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1985); MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS § 13-713 (West 2010); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741
P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987).
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competent, or something in the middle. A “barely competent”
individual has no PFBs but may have many false beliefs, whereas
a “fully competent” individual has no identifiable false beliefs. A
person in the middle may have some number of false beliefs.
Whose decision governs when the SubDM wants to decide
what the person—if competent—would want? Which competent
person? If there are a number of competent or acceptable choices,
then perhaps should we select the choice based on who, so to
speak, is deciding? In considering this, does it matter which
“person” the person is most of the time? Do we want to support
the “best” version of oneself that the person can be? Or, do we
want to look at the most minimally competent person to give the
greatest scope to his autonomy?
We must decide which self to look at, including how
competent he or she must be.

V. Tasks of the SubDM in the Case of
Substituted Judgment and Best Interests
The SubDM on a substituted-judgment standard has various
tasks that he must do: (1) search for any past statements of
preferences regarding the medical decision; (2) consider any
behavioral indicators of preference outside of direct statements;
(3) figure out the person’s goals and values; (4) determine the
range of choices consistent with these goals and values; (5) see
how choices land on significant people in the person’s life (if the
ward is close to them); and, (6) ultimately choose the option that
best serves all of these.41
For the best-interests standard, the substitute decisionmaker
needs to ask: (1) what are the costs and benefits of the different
options; (2) what are the choices a reasonable person in the ward’s
position would want to make; and (3) how the different choices

41.

See generally, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, NAT’L GUARDIANSHIP
ASS’N (2013), available at https://www.guardianship.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/NGA-Standards-with-SummitRevisions-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC72-LMGT]; HANDBOOK
FOR SUBSTITUTE DECISION MAKERS, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. OF MINN.
(Sept. 1999), available at https://mn.gov/omhdd/assets/substitute
decisionmakers_tcm23-27586.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NMG3JAFQ].
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affect the other important people in the person’s life, that is, what
the costs and benefits are to them.42
Note that the competency to make a surrogate treatment
decision in the substituted-judgment context is like competency
to stand trial in that more is involved than simply understanding
and appreciating. Indeed, the criminal defendant has to be able
to assist his lawyer, for example, by remembering what happened
and conveying it, by pointing out exonerating evidence, by
identifying witnesses, etc.43
The SubDM similarly has a variety of tasks, for example,
searching out evidence of what the patient has expressed about
this issue. Suppose that the SubDM doesn’t have the wherewithal
to locate a witness to corroborate what the person has said—or,
to confirm that this evidence indeed exists. He needn’t have the
skills of a private detective, but he has to be able to look into this
and be motivated to do so as well.
Clearly, the SubDM has various tasks to perform that he can
fall down on. When we think about competency of the SubDM,
perhaps it is equivalent to the competency of someone to do any
job, for example, building a house. A contractor can do this well
or poorly, but in any event, there are minimum standards that
she must meet to do the job. In fact, she has to do this reasonably
well. Similarly, when we choose a SubDM, we are likely to select
42.

Michael McCubbin & David Weisstub, Toward a Pure Best
Interests Model of Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent
Psychiatric Patients, 21 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 6–7 (1998);
Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted
Judgement/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A
Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 739, 746 (2012);
ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS:
THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 10 (1990); see
Michael C. Dunn et al., Constructing and Reconstructing ‘Best
Interests’: An Interpretative Examination of Substitute Decision‐
making Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 29 J. SOC. WELFARE
& FAM. L. 117 (2007); see also Ellen H. Moskowitz, Moral
Consensus in Public Ethics: Patient Autonomy and Family
Decision-Making in The Work of One State Bioethics Commission,
21 J. Med. & Phil. 149 (1996).

43.

The “test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding . . . and whether he has a rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
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someone who we believe is well qualified for the job. This person
should have some ability to understand basic medical
information, know the person’s values and norms, have good
judgment, and show genuine concern for the ward’s wellbeing.
But why shouldn’t we look at qualities of a good SubDM,
rather than the minimum criteria? In fact, both are important to
do. The first is what we should aim for. But sometimes there are
reasons to not aim for the best and indeed to aim for someone
only minimally qualified. Perhaps the ward values the SubDM’s
concern for him more highly than he does other criteria. After all,
the ward has an interest in selecting his SubDM and the SubDM,
as we shall see below, has an interest in keeping and performing
this job.
It is also of note that there may be a difference between hiring
and firing a SubDM. We might want to hire, as best we can figure
out, the person most qualified to do this job for the ward. But
once hired, the SubDM should be kept on the job unless she fails
to meet minimum standards. Again, this will further the ward’s
decisional authority in having hired the SubDM—and the
SubDM’s autonomy interest in doing the job.
Additionally, the minimal competency standards that we will
require are, in fact, fairly robust. So even if we can’t or should
not fire the SubDM unless she becomes incompetent in our sense,
then that will leave a large range of decisional authority in the
proxy.
Also, our standard for judging the capacity of a SubDM may
be different depending on how consequential the decision is, both
in terms of whether there are important issues at stake and
whether the particular decision matters much. If the interests
implicated are important and the decision matters a lot, then we
might well want a more competent SubDM.44 One can face an
important decision in the sense that it will affect an important
interest but the choices aren’t importantly different—it’s a tossup.
For example, consider a person who has only a few months
to live and the question is which medication will make him most
comfortable. If each medicine works around equally well, then the
decision is not very consequential. Also, if there is a clearly right
44.

Mark Novak & Sean M. Novak, Clear Today, Uncertain Tomorrow:
Competency and Legal Guardianship and the Role of the Lawyer
in Serving the Needs of Cognitively Impaired Clients, 74 N.D. L.
REV. 295, 302–03 (1998).
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answer and everyone recognizes it, then the SubDM’s identity
doesn’t matter much.
On the other hand, if a decision implicates an important
interest and the decision matters a lot, then we may want a higher
level of capacity in the SubDM. Suppose that a life-saving
procedure, “X,” risks turning the ward into a quadriplegic, while
the only alternative, procedure “Y,” will cause the ward to no
longer talk, or to become seriously cognitively impaired. The
decision is important and we would want the SubDM to have a
high level of decisionmaking capacity.
Note finally that the SubDM’s competence involves both
knowing the ward well—her values, desires, and interests—and
having a good grasp of her medical information. Families are
obviously better at the former and medical personnel at the
latter.45 Good SubDMs should be capable of both.
The idea of varying the level of capacity depending on the
consequentiality of the decision, as it turns out, is controversial.46
If competency doctrine gives patients wide scope in what they
may choose, it follows that they should be given wide scope in
deciding how important a particular decision is to them.

VI. SubDM Competency: How Well Must the
SubDM Understand and Appreciate?
I wish to focus on the SubDM’s competency to make the
substitute decision for someone else in the sense of how well she
must understand and appreciate the options in order to make a
competent choice. For our purposes going forward, we will assume
that a reasonably important choice is at stake.
The issues in competency to decide for oneself don’t track
those in the case of deciding for another. Thus, fostering the
SubDM’s decisional authority is less important than supporting
45.

Alison Barnes, The Virtues of Corporate and Professional
Guardians, 31 STETSON L. REV. 941, 954–56 (2002).
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Fredrick E. Vars, Illusory Consent: When an Incapacitated Patient
Agrees to Treatment, 87 OR. L. REV. 353, 357 (2008); Samantha
Weyrauch, Decision Making for Incompetent Patients: Who
Decides and by What Standards, 35 TULSA L.J. 765, 778–81 (2000);
Saks & Behnke, supra note 1, at 124; ELYN R. SAKS, COMPETENCY
TO DECIDE ON TREATMENT AND RESEARCH: THE MACARTHUR
CAPACITY INSTRUMENTS 2:59–78 (1999), commissioned by NAT’L
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N.
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the ward’s decisional authority. Deciding about oneself is a more
personal, heartfelt thing, than making a decision about someone
else. It hurts more to take away one’s autonomy to decide for
oneself. You could also be unable to decide for another, not
because you lack skills, but because you don’t know the ward well
enough, you have values and interests that clash with his, or you
may be better at caring for yourself than for another. So, it is less
a statement about oneself and one’s limitations.
Taking choice away from the person himself is to discredit
him more. You, who are theoretically in the best position to
decide for yourself, are nevertheless deprived of the opportunity
to choose. The SubDM’s autonomy interest is simply less than
the ward’s himself.
The ward’s autonomy is important for at least two reasons.
For one, it feels good to exercise choice and to have one’s choice
honored because one feels respected as an autonomous agent. And
for another, we think that decisions by the person herself are
likelier to serve her well-being. That is, we think that the person
who knows herself best and cares about herself most is likelier to
make the best choice for herself.
For the SubDM, however, the calculation is different. Her
autonomy may be important because it feels good to exercise
choice and have it recognized. But again, it is more gratifying,
and it confers more dignity, to have your choice about yourself
respected than having your choice about another recognized.
Again, it is a greater assault on one’s dignity and autonomy to
take choice away over oneself.
Perhaps more important, we don’t grant autonomy to the
SubDM because we think that she will make the best choice for
a ward in a way we think her best interests will be served when
she decides for herself. Generally, people know themselves best
and care about themselves most, so they are likelier to make good
decisions for themselves, leading to the person’s best interests
being served. At least in principle. So, we might tolerate more
scope to make the decision—for example, endorse certain beliefs—
for the person deciding for herself versus for another. The scope
of allowable decisions is simply larger because we are keenly
focused on the person’s own autonomy in the service of her own
best interests.
In short, we allow a greater range of choices for oneself for
two reasons. First, it enlarges one’s autonomy to have greater
scope to make choices. Second, we think that affording the ward
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some autonomy to exercise choice over himself is likelier to help
him. The SubDM’s wellbeing from choosing, then, is incidental
(again, she feels good helping another), and not the point of the
choice: To serve the ward’s wellbeing. If it would hurt the SubDM
for the SubDM to make a particular decision for the ward, but
that decision would be best for the ward, then she would have to
make that decision.
It’s also sometimes the case, of course, that more autonomy
will lead to worse decisions. Still, when someone is making a
choice for himself, we may think it is permissible to trade off some
of his own wellbeing for the sake of his autonomy. But it makes
little sense to trade off some of the ward’s wellbeing for the sake
of the SubDM’s autonomy.
In short, since the SubDM’s competency to make a choice for
herself is not at issue, there’s not a strong autonomy argument to
respect her choice and we need not give wide scope for her to form
her beliefs as best she thinks. We may want her, as far as possible,
to have correct beliefs (as best we can tell) rather than beliefs
that are not patently false.
For example, take identifying beliefs connected with the
ward’s goals and values. Suppose that she has a goal of using
enough medication—but not too much. The SubDM might hold
a PFB that the ward wants to limit the use of medication because
he thinks that medication is mostly—and quite literally—poison.
The SubDM’s PFB would remove choice from the SubDM. She
might require treatment that the ward would want to reasonably
refuse because of her PFB about his beliefs and goals.
An example of a false belief (but not a PFB) would be the
ward has the goal because he doesn’t like a particular side-effect
that occurs at a specific dose, when he actually doesn’t mind this
but disprefers a different side effect from a different dose. If the
SubDM has this false belief, then she is arguably not in a position
to decide for the patient because she is wrong about what the
ward prefers and disprefers and therefore is wrong about what
the particular choice should be on his behalf.
While some false beliefs are easy to identify—for example, if
the ward talks a lot about hating a particular side effect—others
may be less clear. We can’t require the SubDM to get everything
right or to have no false beliefs—just to make a reasonable effort
at this.
Another (perhaps easier) example is in the best-interests
context, where we look at the costs and benefits of a decision.
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Again, the patient himself should have no PFBs; if he believes
that there is a risk of nuclear explosion if he takes meds, then
that is a PFB that would vitiate capacity. But the SubDM herself
should arguably have no false beliefs, to the extent this is possible
and knowable. For example, if all the evidence is that the risk of
tardive dyskenisia (TD) from anti-psychotics is thirty percent,
and the SDM believes that it is one percent, then that would
arguably vitiate her capacity on the issue of the ward taking
medications.
Of course, very mild distortions would be OK: for example,
the SubDM believes the TD risk is twenty-eight percent, when it
actually is thirty percent. And of course, it’s often true that the
absolute truth about things is not known. Getting one of these
wrong (which we cannot know) would not undermine capacity.
On the other hand, the question arises about what to do if
there is a majority view about the truth of something and a
minority view. Does the SubDM have to adopt the majority view?
What if she has reason to think the minority view is right, or
right for the ward: Can she adopt that? Note also that even a
number of unimportantly wrong beliefs would arguably not
undermine capacity. The beliefs have to be at least somewhat
significant. So, if the SubDM slightly underestimate how much a
blood draw will hurt, even over several blood draws, then that is
arguably not enough to vitiate capacity.47
One of the most problematic things a SubDM can do is get
the person’s values and desires wrong. This is critical with the
substituted-judgment standard, but it is also arguably true with
the best-interests standard. Part of being “best” is meeting the
desires and expectations of the person, i.e., taking into account
what she wants.
Note finally that an understudied issue in both the SubDM
and the SDM contexts is the proxy or support person’s ability to
empathize with the decisionmaker. The more that the proxy or
support person can stand in the shoes of the impaired person to
47.

See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.
J. 899, 916 (1994); Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski,
Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 257, 270 (2005); John Kindley, The Fit Between the
Elements for an Informed Consent Cause of Action and the
Scientific Evidence Linking Induced Abortion with Increased
Breast Cancer Risk, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 1595, 1605 (1988); Smith v.
Shannon, 666 P.2d 351, 354 (Wash. 1983).
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understand where he or she is coming from and why, then the
better the substitute or supported decision will be.

VII. Complexifying the Capacity of the SubDM
I want to now complexify the notion that the SubDM must
have a high level of capacity. The ward may have selected the
SubDM for a number of different reasons. Suppose that she selects
the SubDM for the SubDM’s welfare—grief about one’s situation
might thereby be diminished. Or, she selects the SubDM as a sign
of her love for him. So, the surrogate can be less than fully or
ideally competent because he was chosen for other reasons than
his maximal capacity to get the surrogate decision right.48
Additionally, as I discussed above, the SubDM may care
about being able to choose. The SubDM may have a desire to act
for someone else’s benefit—but for his own reasons as well. He
may want some control over the exercise of meaningful tasks. He
has a strong interest in not being displaced in this role by someone
who is judged to be better informed or more rational or better at
understanding what the patient will have wanted.49
One problem with the first idea is that it is hard, in real time,
to distinguish cases where the person has a special reason to not
care about suboptimal choices because of her particular reasons
for choosing the SubDM. I suppose we could have a norm that
the ward indicates in advance why she is selecting the SubDM.
But absent some evidence, the question becomes where the
presumption should be. I suggest we should presume that the
ward wants the best and most competent decision possible.
An alternative is to presume that the ward has an autonomy
interest in choosing his SubDM and, even if the SubDM becomes
somewhat impaired, honoring the ward’s choice is more important
than making the objectively “best” decision. This of course would
only be at play in those circumstances in which the ward has had
a voice in the choice of his SubDM. A ward might be too
incapacitated to even choose a SubDM. On the other hand, a
ward is likely to presume that his SubDM has a certain amount
of ability to make decent decisions for him. That is, he won’t
anticipate that the SubDM will be impaired herself.

48.

I thank Scott Altman for this point.

49.

I thank Scott Altman for this point, as well.
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As for the SubDM’s autonomy, I concede, as suggested, that
the SubDM does not entirely lack autonomy interests. Take the
analogy of a parent deciding for her child. She values her
autonomy in doing this, even while the primary welfare being
served is the child’s.50 I would suggest, though, that the SubDM’s
autonomy interest in having his choice respected is not as strong
as a decisionmaker’s interest in making her own decisions, as we
have seen, or even of a parent making a decision for her minor
child.
Is this true, though, of a SubDM making a choice for an adult
family member? She may get great utility in exercising her powers
to help the family member. And this will often be the scenario in
the substitute decisionmaking process: A relative will have been
appointed to be the SubDM. This makes some sense, but of course
we cannot settle the question without empirical research—
something that I would advocate be done. Still, in the context of
deciding for another, I think, one wants to make the right decision
more than simply being the one to decide.

VIII. SubDM Competency versus Reasonableness
One might balk at the idea that the SubDM must have a
higher degree of capacity than the ward. Perhaps his capacity is
measured in the same way as the ward’s; it’s just that, as a
fiduciary of the ward, he must be not only rational but also
reasonable. For example, if it is rational (but not reasonable) for
the SubDM to believe something—that some action is below the
standard of care for a doctor or fiduciary—then choice should
arguably be taken away from him.
Consider that the SubDM is caring for his ward in the same
way that a doctor cares for her patients. Arguably, the SubDM’s
beliefs should be measured by what a reasonable surrogate would
believe, just as a clinician’s acts should be measured by what a
reasonable clinician would do.51 By contrast, the person herself
50.

E.g., Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647
(2002); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist
Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 937 (1996); Carol K. Dillon
Margaret Betsy, In Re Roger S.: The Impact of a Child’s Due
Process Victory on the California Mental Health System, 70 CAL.
L. REV. 373, 380 (1982).
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should be forbidden only to have beliefs that seriously depart from
a rational person’s beliefs. She has the right to be unreasonable.
But should we hold surrogates to the standard of a reasonable
surrogate in the same way we hold doctors? They need not be
professionals. On the other hand, perhaps even friends’ help is
judged by a standard of reasonableness—if you intervene, then
you must be reasonable. Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that
even helpful bystanders intervening are, in some jurisdictions,
judged by a standard of reasonableness. So the important
distinction is between acting on behalf of oneself versus acting on
behalf of another. In the latter case you need to be reasonable.
The analogy to a doctor providing treatment, or a person
helping another, may suggest that the surrogate indeed must be
reasonable. But given this, perhaps it could be argued that we
needn’t concern ourselves with the capacity of the SubDM at all
because, unlike the patient himself, the SubDM has to make a
reasonable decision. So, if she makes a reasonable decision but
lacks capacity, then it does not matter.
But I would suggest that making a reasonable decision does
not mean that one needn’t have capacity. If, say, there are five
reasonable choices, then the SubDM must have the capacity to
choose among them as to which best meets the standard in
question: substituted judgment or best interests.
Consider, too, that in the context of the capacity of a person
to decide for herself, making a reasonable decision does not mean
that one has capacity. For example, one could make a reasonable
choice on the basis of a PFB, when one would have wanted a
different reasonable choice. And this could lead to a finding of
incapacity. Indeed, a person may try to communicate a choice by
blinking his eyes. But if that is all that we have to go by, then
honoring the blink, so to speak, does not make much sense. Does
a blink indicate “yes” or “no?” And how do we know that it is
not completely random?
If this is so, then the patient himself must not be grossly
irrational (incompetent) but needn’t be reasonable. By contrast,
the SubDM must be both rational and reasonable. Being
reasonable does not remove the need for rationality because one
§ 163 (2019); Aves v. Shah, 997 F.2d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 1993);
Rehab. Care Sys. of Am. v. Davis, 43 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2001); Susan L. Thomas, Establishing Causation—Medical
Malpractice, 15 GA. JUR. PERSONAL INJURY AND TORTS § 36:31
(2020).

22

Health Matrix·Volume 30·2020
Competency to Decide for Another

must have enough rationality to choose among reasonable choices.
And the SubDM also has to meet a higher level of rationality or
competency than the patient himself.
The bottom line, then, is that the SubDM must have more
intact reasoning than the ward; the SubDM must behave with a
higher level of ability than a person deciding for himself. The
important distinction is between acting on behalf of oneself versus
acting on behalf of another. In the latter case you need to be both
rational and reasonable.

Conclusion
A SubDM plays an important function in the lives of their
wards, people who have lost capacity to make their own decisions.
The SubDM must do her best to choose the decision that would
best approximate to what the ward would have wanted if
competent.
We have seen that this is more complicated than it might at
first seem: “who” is the competent self whose wishes should be
respected? The “best self?” The “self in control most of the time?”
The “self currently in control?”
And how do we determine what he or she would have wanted?
What she says? What she says about related things? What
decision is most consistent with her stated needs and values? How
the decision affects her family (unless, of course, they are at
odds)? And what do we do if there is serious conflict among these?
The main contribution of this Essay is to ponder what
capacity means in the context of substitute decisionmaking. The
context of deciding for oneself can be somewhat a model for
capacity in the decisionmaking context, but some of the interests
are different. Teasing out these differences will lead to a standard
of capacity that is specifically designed for this context.
So, the degree to which the SubDM must be competent in
the sense of understanding and appreciating the issues at stake is
high. She is caring for someone else’s welfare and her own
autonomy to form beliefs with a wide range of correctness is a
minor issue if an issue at all.
Finally, going forward, there is a great need to develop
instruments to measure SubDM capacity. In addition, there is a
great need to study SubDM capacity empirically.
In conclusion, pondering the competency of SubDMs to make
decisions for their wards further describes the space of acceptable
decisionmaking in the context of surrogate decisionmaking.

23

